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 Stuck in crime and punishment 
North Korea tests; the UN Security Council convenes; the world con-
demns; more sanctions are initiated; China negotiates with the US to di-
lute the sanctions; the United States discusses military countermeasures 
with its Asian allies – and North Korea continues its nuclear and missile 
programs. The same cycle is repeated over and over again in a crime and 
punishment mode.  
There is nothing to indicate that this approach works as intended. At 
a press conference on February 23, 2016, when the latest round of sanc-
tions was announced, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and US Secre-
tary of State John Kerry admitted as much: “(sanctions) cannot provide 
a fundamental solution to the Korean nuclear issue” (Wang) and “..re-
petitive punishments…do not lead anywhere” (Kerry).2  
A different approach is needed. In addition to 25 years of experience 
in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem, some lessons can be 
drawn from the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) between the big powers and Iran.   
The role of sanctions 
When UN sanctions were first imposed on Iran in 2006, a few hundred 
centrifuges were installed. The sanctions were ramped up four times and 
comprehensive US and EU economic and financial sanctions were 
added. Yet, when Hassan Rouhani was elected president in 2013, the 
number of centrifuges had increased to 19 000. The evidence flies in 
your face: the sanctions did not stop the nuclear program. 
However, when realistic expectations of sanctions relief emerged, 
Iran offered its fair share of concessions and compromises to make an 
agreement possible. Then – and only then – did the sanctions function 
the way they were meant to do. In other words: for sanctions to be in-
strumental, there has to be a real possibility of lifting them. In the case 
of North Korea, that prospect has been missing.  
Of course, North Korea is very different from Iran. Iran is outward ori-
ented and well trained in the conduct of international affairs. Its foreign 
trade is comprehensive, and its oil and gas export is rapidly approaching 
pre-sanctions level. It represents a proud civilization and felt underesti-
mated and humiliated by the derogatory treatment it was exposed to. In 
the face of comprehensive sanctions, it had to go for more self-reliance 
                                                          
2  Remarks With Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, U.S. Department of State, Wash-
ington, DC, February 23, 2016. 
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– often referred to as “resistance economy” - but it longed to be reinte-
grated and accepted by the international community as a sovereign state 
with its own legitimate interests.  
By contrast, under its founding father Kim Il Sung the North Korean 
regime purified its juche doctrine of self-reliance and willingly isolated 
itself not to be exposed to values and lifestyles that could undermine it. 
Economic sanctions do bite in North Korea, too, but to a much smaller 
extent than in the case of Iran. The reasons are historical and cultural as 
well as economic.  
In Iran, the UN sanctions were perhaps more important for their po-
litical than for their economic impact, projecting pariah status not only 
on entities and individuals but, per implication, on the Iranian nation. 
What hit the Iranian economy hardest were the comprehensive US and 
EU economic and financial sanctions. During the negotiation of the 
JCPOA, they were the main bargaining cards of the Western powers.  
Translated to the case of North Korea, what comes closest to the West-
ern economic and financial sanctions would be a signal from China that 
in the face of continued recalcitrance, it might terminate its policy of en-
gagement and sheltering: if you do not accommodate and curtail your 
nuclear and missile programmes, the (modest) cooperation that exists 
will be terminated. You would be on your own, and can no longer count 
on us to be your lifeline. So far, China has been steadfast in its policy of 
engagement, protecting the regime to keep the US at a distance. How-
ever, different from the policy toward Taiwan, which is elevated above 
public scrutiny, the policy toward North Korea is a legitimate subject of 
debate. The critical voices are plenty, so a policy shift may not be all that 
far-fetched.   
Still, to convince the Chinese to ramp up the sanctions in advance of 
renewed talks is a long shot. China thinks the problem is not just North 
Korea, but the US as well, so absent a genuine US willingness to go for a 
diplomatic solution it is unlikely to put much more pressure on the 
North. What may be done during a negotiation is another matter. If the 
US shows a clear interest in negotiating a comprehensive deal, the 
choice between loss of its sole supporter and comprehensive sanctions 
relief may convince Pyongyang to go an extra mile on arms control to get 
an agreement.     
Preconditions for negotiations 
After 35 tense years, when Iran and the United States were each other’s 
number one enemies for much of the time, they managed to start con-
structive negotiations without conditions on the basis of mutual respect. 
The result bears witness to what became a win-win negotiation: the par-
ties got the most in the areas that mattered most to them, arms control 
for the United States and sanctions relief for Iran. 
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Once again, North Korea is different. It is customary to perceive of 
North Korea as aggressive and potentially irrational, but it was never US 
enemy number one. When Pyongyang took actions that worried Japan 
and South Korea, the US reached out to support its allies, but without 
the bellicosity directed at Iran. In-between the flare-ups, North Korea 
was a curiosity that the US could afford to ignore: then, the North Kore-
ans sometimes took to provocations to “wake the US up”. Often, inaction 
was also due to the fact that South Korea and Japan did not want it to 
make deals with the North.3 George W. Bush lumped North Korea to-
gether with Iran and Syria in the “axis of evil”, but the Iranian evil was 
clearly of a higher political order. Unwavering US support for Israel ac-
counts for much of the difference.  
Only recently has North Korea emerged as a direct military threat to 
US bases and allies in East Asia. A new consensus is emerging in the US 
intelligence community that North Korea is able to place nuclear war-
heads on missiles of modest range (dissenting voices remain). As of June, 
2016, however, all tests of the medium-range Musudan, which could 
reach Guam, had more or less failed, and no intercontinental missile has 
been flight-tested so far. It probably takes many more years to mount a 
potent threat to the US homeland.    
Still, freezing the programme has become a matter of some urgency. 
Washington has tried to obtain a commitment to denuclearization – e.g. 
a freeze on nuclear and missile testing and fissile material production – 
making this a pre-condition for negotiations. This position has now been 
amended to a willingness to sit down with Pyongyang (without condi-
tions), to discuss US preconditions for negotiations.4 North Korea has 
proposed a halt in nuclear testing in return for a halt in US-South Korean 
military exercises, but Washington has asked it to do more and do better 
than communicating through the media. 
In a sense, time is on North Korea’s side. The closer it comes to a ca-
pability to threaten US and allied assets, the more important it becomes 
to get a deal blocking that eventuality. This is reflected in the sequence 
in which the parties want to address the issues involved: while the US 
wants some denuclearization commitments first, North Korea gives pri-
ority to normalization and a peace treaty.  
Time is of the essence for China as well. The more the North Korean 
programme advances and the stronger the US countermeasures, the 
more China is affected. When the US says North Korea, China is impli-
cated. US build-up in its vicinity – of missile defence in particular - un-
dermines its security. In a comprehensive negotiation, China may there-
fore be willing to enhance its pressure on North Korea. The Chinese chair 
                                                          
3  The exceptions were South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh  and Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi. 
4  Sigal, op.cit. 
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of the suspended six-power talks holds that both sets of issues – denu-
clearization and normalization - must be addressed simultaneously, and 
it favours negotiations without preconditions. 
How North Korea weighs its interests in normalization and economic 
growth vs further development of a nuclear deterrent capability, we do 
not know. The only way to find out is for the US to negotiate and keep its 
end of the bargain and see if they do. North Korea is biding its time to 
negotiate at an opportune moment, but it is an open question whether 
or to what extent it will acquiesce to nuclear constraints to get compre-
hensive negotiations going.  
Probes 
If pre-conditions cannot be agreed, probes of seriousness in striking a 
deal become all the more important, and not only for the US: The North 
Koreans, too, must be reassured that the US is serious about normaliza-
tion. 
Prior to Rouhani’s election and the subsequent negotiation of the 
JCPOA, Iran and the US met in secret in Oman to test the waters for a 
negotiated settlement. Oman has an interesting history as a diplomatic 
go-between, and rendered its services to the parties’ satisfaction.5 A new 
round of negotiations with North Korea also has to be preceded by extra 
efforts to establish the realism of a policy shift and what it may be about. 
In view of all the disappointments of the past, this is a must.       
Kim Jong Un says he would enhance nuclear deterrence and improve 
people’s standard of living. He inherited the nuclear priority from his fa-
ther Kim Jong Il, but is more outspoken on the second objective. The 
thinking appears similar to be that of the big powers during the Cold War 
(before the huge clean-up costs of nuclear weapons production were ad-
dressed): nuclear weapons are less expensive than conventional ones, 
providing “bigger bang for the buck”. North Korea has the fourth largest 
army in the world with 700 000 active frontline personnel and 
4.500.000 reserves – a formidable drain on resources.  In part, a func-
tioning nuclear deterrent may substitute for conventional forces and, 
therefore, free resources for use in civilian sectors. 
Obviously, access to international markets can also do much to raise 
the living standard of ordinary North Koreans. When the Cold War 
ended; the Soviet Union collapsed; and China looked in all other direc-
tions than North Korea, Kim Il Sung tried to improve relations with the 
                                                          
5  Jeremy Jones, «Oman’s quiet Diplomacy», February 2014. Available at 
http://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Oman-s-Quiet-Diplomacy 
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United States, Japan, South Korea and others, but the nuclear pro-
gramme came in the way. Ever since, Pyongyang has sought to end the 
conflict with its arch enemies. 
However, sanctions relief and economic normalization may not be 
among his most acute concerns. After all, the North Korean economy is 
growing, however slowly. The leadership probably believes that it can 
muddle along while waiting for a comprehensive political settlement 
along the lines envisioned in the September 2005 six-party joint state-
ment. Yet Kim’s emphasis on people’s standard of living would seem to 
pull him in the direction of an economic opening to the world. The ques-
tion is to what extent, the traditional assumption being that the benefits 
of international interaction are weighed against perceived threats to the 
regime’s survival.  
A better understanding of leadership priorities is essential to set fu-
ture negotiations on a realistic track. The Omani example is worth repli-
cating, in bilateral and/or multilateral form.       
Scope 
The Framework Agreement of 1994 committed the US and North Korea 
to move 
toward normalization of economic and political relations, including 
by reducing barriers to investment, opening liaison offices, and ulti-
mately exchanging ambassadors. In essence, however, the agreement 
centred on the nuclear sector. North Korea would receive two large LWRs 
while phasing out its indigenous nuclear installations. Pending comple-
tion of the reactors, North Korea would receive fuel oil.  
Over the years, the implementation of the agreement fell behind 
schedule. By the time the agreement collapsed, the first LWR - which 
should have been gone operational in 2003 - was only 20 percent fin-
ished. In 2002, when the US claimed that North Korea had a secret en-
richment program - which Pyongyang denied, but which was later con-
firmed – the agreement was terminated. The overriding objective for 
Pyongyang was to move toward political and economic normalization”, 
i.e., end the enmity. The reactors were important – North Korea had been 
interested in LWR for a long time - but they were not the be all and end 
all. 
In the period 2003 – 2013, Iran and the big powers exchanged views 
not only on nuclear matters, but also on regional conflicts and normali-
zations of relations. The outline that the US caretaker in Iran, Swiss am-
bassador Tim Guldiman, brought to Washington in the summer of 2003, 
covered a formidable range of contentious issues.6 However, when the 
                                                          
6  Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice, Yale University Press, 2012. 
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right constellation of governments was in place in 2013, strict limitation 
to nuclear issues was agreed not to overburden the negotiation.  
More than anything else, it was the prospect of sanctions relief that 
brought Iran back to the international community as a bona fide partner. 
Iran could pick up from where it left when the sanctions were imposed; 
international business was keen to get back to a market of 78 million 
people; and the Rouhani government made economic reforms its top pri-
ority in order to make that happen. Not so with North Korea. Decades of 
self-isolation reinforced by sanctions means that there is much less to 
revive. Normality includes a modicum of economic cooperation and po-
litical connectivity with other countries and international organizations, 
but this has to start from scratch.  
The meaning of normalization 
To bring North Korea into the international community as a bona fide 
partner is therefore a demanding proposition. Far from coming about by 
itself once the sanctions are lifted, normalization is a matter of shaping 
something that never existed in the history of the DPRK - not during the 
Cold War, when relations were confined to the Soviet Union and the com-
munist world, and not later, as the nuclear controversy got in the way. 
When the sanctions against Iran kicked in and international compa-
nies withdrew, the Revolutionary Guards filled much of the vacuum. The 
Guards became a major economic actor, controlling a significant part of 
the economy. Its political influence is substantial as well. The Supreme 
Leader relies on the Guards. Whenever the same actor is a major stake-
holder in both the economic and political sphere, the ground is set for 
widespread corruption, and Iran is no exception. To facilitate access for 
international business, the Rouhani government has made the fight 
against corruption a top priority.  
The North Korean political and economic system is uniquely difficult 
to relate to for international companies. The sanctions have enhanced 
the vested interests in continued isolation there, too, and corruption 
thrives at the interface between the growing private sector and old state 
companies. In its present state, the country does not offer much of inter-
est to others, and those who are nevertheless attracted are easily de-
terred by the specter of unpredictability that surrounds the secretive dic-
tatorship. However difficult Iran may be, the problems in North Korea 
are of an entirely different order.  
For North Korea, normalization has many other ingredients as well. 
To be meaningful, a peace treaty substituting for the armistice agree-
ment must ensure a change of military deployments and military exer-
cises away from today’s threatening postures.  
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The borders at sea, which have not been clearly delineated and which 
have led to numerous skirmishes, should be unambiguously agreed. De-
claratory statements should be stripped of provocative language and 
threats of war. It takes a lot to create a sense of normality in relation to 
an abnormal country.         
 Interim accords or an all-encompassing agreement 
The Interim Agreement with Iran – the Joint Plan of Action of November 
2013 – defined the ultimate objective of the talks. At the end of the road, 
Iran would be treated like all other NNWS members of the NPT in good 
standing. The JCPOA spells out the road-map toward that objective. 
Since the parties had little or no confidence in each other, the agreement 
describes the nuclear constraints and the sanctions relief in great detail.  
The statement of principles that was agreed at the six-party talks in 
2005 reiterated the 1992 agreement to denuclearize the Korean penin-
sula. It ruled out both weapons and fuel cycle facilities. The parties un-
dertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and to normalize relations, 
promoting economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and in-
vestment. Furthermore, they agreed to negotiate a permanent peace re-
gime on the Korean peninsula, replacing the armistice agreement with a 
peace treaty. The scope of the undertaking was all-encompassing. 
The parties also agreed to implement their consensus in a phased 
manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, ac-
tion for action”. Concrete, initial steps were agreed in 2007. North Korea 
committed to shut down and disable - in 12 steps - its Yongbyon facilities 
and to submit a list of its nuclear-related activities. When the agreement 
broke down at the end of 2008, 11 of the 12 steps had been imple-
mented. The US would take North Korea off the list of states supporting 
terrorism; provide fuel oil; and engage in talks to normalize relations. 
The agreement outlined a framework for follow-on actions to implement 
the 2005 Joint Statement of Principles. 
The approach to North Korea was different from the approach to Iran. 
The goals were laid out in the Joint Statement – like to Interim Agree-
ment with Iran – but while the JCPOA is a done deal to be implemented 
on a specified time scale, without further negotiations, the approach to 
North Korea envisages a series of interim agreements to be negotiated 
sequentially, step by step on the basis of reciprocity, in an agreed frame-
work including all the main issues waiting for resolution. 
Resumption of negotiations? 
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency in Iran, the enrichment capability 
was very much expanded.  When Rouhani was elected and negotiations 
gained speed, that capability became an important bargaining card. 
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Similarly, during more than seven years with no negotiations or agree-
ments, North Korea has strengthened its bargaining cards by improving 
its nuclear and missile capabilities.  
To entice the North Koreans to a deal, the big powers may ramp up 
both sticks and carrots: the sticks if China, at some stage, would be ready 
to drop its policy of engagement and sheltering; the carrots by offering 
to negotiate the entire gamut of outstanding issues – sanctions relief, 
economic assistance, normalization and a peace treaty. To entice the 
North Koreans to arms control, the readiness to go for a comprehensive 
deal must be communicated in no uncertain terms. Similar to the case of 
Iran, it is only when such a deal becomes a realistic prospect that North 
Korea can be assumed to accept the necessary arms control limitations 
to make it happen. 
The North Koreans likely perceive of the US position to sit down and 
talk about pre-conditions for resumption of talks as a negotiating tactic 
to obtain unilateral concessions. Probably, this is also part of the US 
logic. Another part of it is the need, in view of past failures, to test North 
Korea’s seriousness in a negotiated solution. From Pyongyang’s vantage 
point, the US reneged on past deals, too, so they also need reassurance. 
Hence the need for reciprocal steps. The first part - pressure by procedure 
- is unlikely to work. The posturing over the sequence in which the issues 
should be addressed is a clear sign of disapproval, and so is China’s 
quest for parallel tracks and reciprocity. Probes are quite a different mat-
ter: in such a context, and on condition that the negotiations would be 
conducted along the lines advocated by China, North Korea may offer 
some initial concessions, like a halt in nuclear testing. Or it may not: 
there is no way to know before it has been tried. 
For China, the six-party talks have been a conflict management mech-
anism. As long as North Korea was in the tent, they had a hand on the 
steering wheel. The unruly neighbour could be held within bounds and 
regional stability better managed. However, this modest ambition is not 
good enough any longer. A bigger question is pressing for early clarifi-
cation: will North Korea establish itself as a de facto nuclear weapon 
state with a credible nuclear deterrence capability, or is it still possible 
to reverse its nuclear and missile programmes? The only way to find out 
is to go back to the table. 
War    
The alternative to diplomacy is war, meaning a US attack to destroy the 
North Korean nuclear capabilities. In 1994, the two countries came close 
to military conflict – before Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang and broke 
the ice for the Framework Agreement. 
Pressure is mounting to stop the North Korean build-up before it is 
too late, i.e. before the retaliatory capability has reached a stage where 
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preemption can no longer be assured. Action must be taken before nu-
clear retaliation against US bases in the region can no longer be ignored. 
North Korea is not there yet: even if it has miniaturized its warheads so 
that they can be carried by missiles, by mid-2016 its missile capabilities 
appeared not good enough.  
However, the near future is a period of opportunity for North Korea. 
A presidential election is coming up in the US, so for about a year ahead, 
it will be hard put to launch a high-risk war. In 2017, furthermore, it is 
time for South Korea to have a presidential election, and South Korean 
consent is crucial for any decision to wage war against the North. Pyong-
yang is likely to use this period of opportunity to the best of its abilities.  
In 2003, the EU3 (France, Germany and the UK) launched a diplo-
matic initiative to avert war with Iran. Now, it is high time to give diplo-
macy another chance on the Korean peninsula.  
The alternatives are war or another nuclear weapon state with a de 
facto nuclear deterrent capability. Both are discouraging.            
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